Still another week left in January after today? How long is this month?

Unless the Supreme Court of Canada agrees to take up his case, it looks like this is the end of the line for Mr. Chen. He claimed unemployment benefits after an arrangement he had with a roommate (she bought groceries, he cooked the meals) came to an end. All along the way, it was held that he was not an employee, did not have insurable earnings, and was therefore not entitled to employment insurance benefits: Chen v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 18

The employer’s bid to seek judicial review of the remedy imposed after a finding of unjust dismissal (after the matter had been sent back to the adjudicator for reassessment once already) is denied by the Federal Court. The decision to order reinstatement and not consider the employer’s frustration argument (during the years this matter was fought, the employee was on disability and would have likely been unable to work even if she hadn’t initially been dismissed) was reasonable: Miwapukek Band v. Howse, 2025 FC 86

An interest arbitration award setting the terms for a new collective agreement between ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. and the Natural Gas Employees’ Association (“NGEA”) resulted in a 4% and 3.4% increase in wages in 2024 and 2025 respectively. A good deal of time was spent arguing over the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on previous negotiations and how that would affect the replication principle. The majority of the panel (with the employer nominee dissenting) accepted the NGEA’s argument that this contract should help “catch up” for the lack of an increase during the last contract, although the panel did not award an increase as large as the NGEA sought: Atco Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v Natural Gas Employees’ Association, 2024 CanLII 135359

Normally, a complainant has 90 days to file a duty of fair representation complaint with the Alberta Laobur Relations Board concerning the conduct of their union. Late filing may be accepted based on the factors described in Nevill Toppin v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local Union No. 488, [2006] Alta. L.R.B.R. 31. Here, the complainant filed the DFR complaint February 2024 concerning allegations that stretched back as far as 2020. The panel applied the Toppin factors and dismissed as untimely all but those allegations that arose in November 2023. The panel then dismissed the remaining allegations in the complaint as there was no reasonable prospect of success: Complainant v Health Sciences Association of Alberta, 2025 ALRB 10

In December 2022, UFCW Local No 401 alleged, among other things, that Civeo was either the true employer, a successor employer, or a common employer of its catering staff along with Buffalo Catering Employees Limited Partnership (“BCE”). Details of the procedural history and relevant facts were described in an earlier decision of the Board. Here, BCE and Civeo apply to summarily dismiss the application on the basis that they lack particulars that could establish any arguable grounds for finding that a business or part of a business transferred from BCE to any Civeo entity. The Board summarily dismissed the successor employer application, but sought further submissions from the parties about whether it has jurisdiction to summarily dismiss a common employer application brought as a preliminary objection prior to a hearing on the merits. The Board wanted further submissions because it was not an issue the parties could have foreseen and did not address it at the hearing: United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, Local No. 401 v Buffalo Catering Employees Limited Partnership et al., 2025 ALRB 12

Does the magnitude of an asserted claim determine or affect the level of costs payable on an application not raising monetary issues on its own? Given the ultimate value of the main claim (over $2M), Column 5 costs would normally apply, but because of the entirely procedural nature of the present application, should Column 1 costs apply instead? Unfortunately for us, the court avoids these questions and rules because the respondent acquiesced to Column 5 costs in its submissions, Column 5 costs will be awarded: LAPP Corporation v Alberta, 2025 ABKB 33

On appeal from a decision of an Applications Judge to dismiss a claim for long delay under Rule 4.33, the court considers whether the actions of the defendant engage the exception in Rule 4.33(2)(b) where a matter will not be dismissed if: “an application has been filed or proceedings have been taken since the delay and the applicant has participated in them for a purpose and to the extent that, in the opinion of the Court, warrants the action continuing”. In this case, questioning occurred in December 2018, answers to undertakings provided in March 2019, and several rounds of correspondence arguing about the adequacy of those answers ended in September 2020. Nothing happened until an application to compel answers to undertakings was filed in February 2023. The application was adjourned to accommodate the schedule of the defendant’s counsel. It was adjourned once more for the defendant to prepare a responding affidavit and a further adjournment sine die was granted to allow counsel to explore resolution. Delay was not raised until after the first few adjournments. The Applications Judge found there was a clearly a delay of more than 3 years and dismissed the action. They ruled that the filed but unheard application to compel undertakings could not be a step that advanced the action and participation in that proceeding did not have the quality of acting as participation or acquiescence for the purposes of Rule 4.33(2)(b). However, on appeal, the court found that the defendant’s participation in the application to compel answers to undertakings warranted the action to continue. The court said the affidavit filed by the defendant in response to the application was more or less an admission that the earlier answers to undertakings were inadequate and, in and of itself, the response in the affidavit was also inadequate. Had the application gone ahead when initially scheduled, the plaintiff likely would have won. Between this and the defendant’s actions after the application was filed, the defendant therefore participated in the proceeding in a manner that warranted the action to continue. Note that the Applications Judge did not address the defendant’s application to dismiss under Rule 4.31 and that decision was not appealed so the court did not consider any arguments in that regard at this hearing: Secan Association Inc. v Cannan, 2025 ABKB 38

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Industrial Relations Board (“CIRB”) to decline consideration of an unjust dismissal complaint related to an alleged constructive dismissal resulting from age and race-based discrimination and harassment. The CIRB found, and the Federal Court of Appeal agreed, that the proper forum for the complaint was the Canadian Human Rights Commission because human rights allegations lay at the core of the complaint. Under s. 242(3.1)(b) of the Canada Labour Code, no complaint will be considered by the CIRB if a procedure for redress is provided under any other Act of Parliament. The general provisions in the Code to address unjust dismissal could not prevail over the clear and mandatory provisions in s. 242(3.1)(b). The complainant also argued that she would suffer prejudice if she was forced to file a human rights complaint so long after the fact and could not get the remedies there that she sought from the CIRB. The court ruled that the complainant could have filed a human rights complaint when the CIRB first wrote to her raising the possibility of dismissing the unjust dismissal complaint under s. 242(3.1)(b), but chose not to. Further, the remedies available from the Canadian Human Rights Commission need not be the same as or better than those under the Code, but they simply had to offer a “real remedy”: Kaseke v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 2025 FCA 8