Applications Judge Farrington heard a summary judgment application in a special chambers hearing concerning the plaintiff’s alleged constructive dismissal claim. The plaintiff was a long-term employee (37 years) who worked from home as the office manager for a vein clinic. When ownership changed, she was given three months’ notice to “return” to the office on a full-time basis even though this was never an in-office role. The plaintiff took the position that this was constructive dismissal. There was some negotiation about a more flexible return to the office, but no agreement was reached. The court found that working from home was an integral part of the employment contract and inadequate notice was given to change that term resulting in a constructive dismissal. The court considered the analysis in Wronko and found that it would not be reasonable for the plaintiff to have accepted in mitigation the modified return to the office proposal of the employer. The court requested further submissions to determine the reasonable notice period and damages.

Readers may recall Applications Judge Farrington had some pointed comments on the availability of summary judgment to determine damages in wrongful dismissal matters. In his view, determining the reasonable notice period was not something that was permitted by a strict reading of the summary judgment rules. Summary trial (which has now been replaced by the streamlined trial procedure… although the jury seems to be out on whether that is going to be a viable method for hearing wrongful dismissal claims) or referring the matter to a damages assessment would be more appropriate: Coffey v. Nine Energy Canada Inc, 2017 ABQB 417

Applications Judge Farrington appears to have changed his view in light of more recent developments and has now come around on using summary judgment in these sorts of matters:

[24]            Hannam v Medicine Hat School District No. 76, 2020 ABCA 343 emphasizes the new litigation culture adopted by Hryniak and Weir-Jones, and it encourages the use of the summary judgment rule to resolve cases, and I find that it applies in this case.

[25]           I pause to discuss one more point briefly. I wrote in Coffey v. Nine Energy Canada Inc, 2017 ABQB 417 (which was a wrongful dismissal case) about what, in my view, are the differences between summary (now streamlined) trials and summary judgment applications in matters of unliquidated claims. Justice Marion determined liability and assessed employment damages within a summary judgment context in McDonald v Sproule Management GP Limited, 2023 ABKB 587. In light of the decision of Justice Marion in McDonald v. Sproule Management GP Limited, and what appears to be a modern tendency to apply the summary judgment rule broadly to include assessments as a part of summary judgment applications in unliquidated damages cases such as wrongful dismissal settings, I have elected to deal with the damages assessment within the context of the summary judgment application rather than refer the matter to an assessment of damages hearing. I do, however, remain of the view that there is a difference between summary judgment and summary trial procedures, and how to define and delineate those differences will likely require further guidance and discussion.

Nickles v 628810 Alberta Ltd., 2025 ABKB 212

The Alberta Human Rights Tribunal granted a complainant’s request for an adjournment to allow new counsel to prepare after losing confidence in previous counsel. This is a complex complaint with a lengthy history, voluminous submissions, and many days of hearing scheduled. While granting the adjournment, the Tribunal ordered $8,000 in costs because of the complainant’s conduct in getting to this point (which resulted in about 8 out of 20 scheduled days of hearing going to waste after granting the adjournment): Elliott v Imperial Oil Limited, 2025 AHRC 42

In this employment standards appeal, the panel found that the employee neither quit nor resigned. Instead, she repudiated the employment contract by issuing an ultimatum to her employer and refusing to return to work until the concerns she raised were addressed. The employer was prepared to have her return under the existing conditions and when the employee did not return to work, it could consider her to have repudiated the employment agreement. As a result, no termination pay was owed: Tyalta Industries Inc. v Connolly, 2025 ABESAB 6

Arbitrator William Caplan’s award in the interest arbitration between CN and the Teamsters has been released. The judicial review of the Minister’s referral to the CIRB and the CIRB’s decision directing the parties to recommence operations has not yet been heard, however: Canadian National Railway v Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, 2025 CanLII 29116

The question before the Supreme Court of British Columbia was whether the parties in a wrongful dismissal lawsuit had reached a binding and enforceable settlement agreement. The defendants’ counsel had proposed a settlement offer involving the payment of a lump sum less applicable deductions, a lump sum in lieu of benefit continuation, and that the plaintiff would execute a release in a form acceptable to the defendants which would include confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions. The plaintiff’s counsel responded that the offer was acceptable provided the form of release was mutually acceptable (no form of release had apparently been exchanged) and the payments to the plaintiff are made in a tax effective matter (including a portion paid directly as legal fees and the balance paid without withholdings as a 1099 (which was described as a US tax form used to report various types of non-employment income (which you and I both already knew, of course, but I thought it would be handy to set out for the novice reader who may stumble across this post))). The Court found the plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving the parties reached a settlement agreement. The tax treatment of the settlement funds was of great importance to both parties. Relying on Fieguth v Acklands Ltd., the Court held the gap in their positions could not be overlooked or resolved by resorting to common sense or common practice so there was no enforceable agreement: Brink v Xos Services (Canada), Inc., 2025 BCSC 658