The Supreme Court of British Columbia had to decide whether the plaintiff principal of the defendant school resigned without adequate notice or was constructively dismissed. The school was undergoing restructuring and a new principal was hired. The plaintiff was offered an alternative role and, according to emails submitted by the defendant, accepted the role. The plaintiff argued the email was just acceptance of a change in his title and not to a new role. The court agreed that the change from full-time principal to part-time senior consultant was a substantial change to the employment contract. The court went on to find that the employee had a reasonable amount of time (May to September) to consider the offer and decide whether to accept it or sue for constructive dismissal. Throughout that time, the employee’s words and actions were consistent with agreement to take on the new role (with the exception of a single text message early in the process where the employee stated he had been constructively dismissed). As a result, the court found that the employee was not constructively dismissed, but resigned three days after his new role took effect: Chowne v Timesing Education Group Inc., 2025 BCSC 1196

In another case from the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the court had to rule on termination versus resignation once again. The importance of handling retirement discussions for long-term employees carefully and confirming understanding in writing is underscored in this case. The employee admitted he had communicated his intention to retire and that he and the employer had been discussing a plan for retirement. However, the employee argued he did not make a clear and unequivocal offer to retire that was capable of being accepted by the employer. While the plaintiff argued the initial date for his retirement was merely a target and not set in stone, the court found a subsequent request by the plaintiff to extend the retirement date for two months to March 31 was a clear and unequivocal offer to retire on a specific date that was accepted by the employer. Therefore, the employee had retired and was not wrongfully dismissed: Pringle v Ritchie-Smith Feeds, Inc, 2025 BCSC 1211

The Alberta Human Rights Tribunal declined a complainant’s request to reconsider an earlier decisions of the Tribunal. The complainant had applied for an order requiring the respondent to produce certain records. The Tribunal dismissed that application and the complainant applied for reconsideration on the basis that the Tribunal’s decision “is not right”. The Tribunal found disagreement with an earlier decision was not sufficient and the complainant had not identified any new evidence to be considered by the Tribunal justifying the extraordinary remedy of reconsideration in these circumstances: Okeke v Calgary Police Service, 2025 AHRC 70

In this Employment Standards Appeal, an employee quit her job (or was fired) and opened her own nail studio. She filed an employment standards complaint which resulted in an order for payment to the former employee as well as a single employer declaration finding two individuals, a trade name, and a numbered company were the employer of the employee. The individuals, the trade name, and the numbered company appealed against both findings. The Director of Employment Standards took the position that the single employer declaration should not have been issued and only the numbered company should have been the employer. The Director emphasized that the numbered company was struck from the registrar but later revived which effectively meant it was deemed to have always existed (thought it’s not entirely clear, the initial single employer declaration was based on a misunderstanding about the effect of the numbered company having been struck). The Appeal Body was not persuaded that this was important and pointed to other evidence that the two individuals were operating under an unregistered trade name at times which appeared to be a partnership of the two individuals. The Appeal Body found the appellants presented no compelling evidence to overturn the single employer declaration. The Appeal Body also found that the employee was dismissed rather than resigned. The totality of the evidence in all of the circumstances was more consistent with an employer that terminated an employee who they believe was attempting to compete against it rather than an employee who decided to quit. Finally, the Appeal Body made some minor amendments to the calculation of amounts owing and varied that part of the order while upholding the rest: 2210251 Alberta Corporation v. Parkhomenko, 2025 ABESAB 11

The Court of King’s Bench of Manitoba dismissed the employee’s application for summary judgment based on the analysis of the termination clause in the plaintiff’s employment agreement. The employee had been terminated without cause and paid in accordance with the terms of his employment agreement. The relevant clause read:

5.2      Termination Without Cause by Colin’s.  Colin’s may terminate the Employee’s [i.e., Mr. Hebert’s] employment at any time during the Term [defined in paragraph 1.1 as “a period of four (4) years commencing August 1^st 2021 (the “Term”)] without cause subject to notice or payment in lieu of notice or some combination of notice and pay in lieu, in accordance with the Employment Standards Code of Manitoba, but termination by Colin’s without cause shall not prejudice the Employee’s right to the outstanding balance of the Note issued by Colin’s under the SPA [i.e., the promissory note for $250,000 and share purchase agreement referred to earlier].

The employee argued his employment was a four-year fixed-term contract and that he was entitled to payment from the termination date to the end of the term of his contract. He argued further or in the alternative that the termination clause was not enforceable because it did not comply with the Employment Standards Code and is therefore void. The court agreed that they were dealing with a fixed-term contract but found paragraph 5.2 of the agreement introduced early termination rights for the employer. The court found the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words in the provision were obvious and they conferred on the employer the right to terminate employment at any time during the term of the agreement upon provision of notice or pay in lieu of notice in accordance with the Code. The court also rejected the employee’s arguments that the clause was ambiguous, that it was unreasonable (because it would allow the employer to immediately terminate a four-year contract with only two-weeks notice), and that it should be tossed out because the “for cause” termination provision is illegal. On the latter point, the employee argued a la Waksdale, that if the definition of cause is broader than what is permitted in legislation, the clause would be illegal. The court was not convinced the definition of cause in the agreement raised this issue: Hebert v. Colin’s Mechanical Service Ltd., 2025 MBKB 87